EDWARD N. SMITH Throughout the twentieth century, China and its people witnessed great—often violent—social changes, from dynastic imperial rule of the Qing and foreign encroachment at the start of the century, to the era of rule by warlords and the Guomindang, to brutal colonial conquests by Japan, and finally the establishment of Communist government and the Party’s growing pains of the latter half of the century. During the opening of the century, decidedly anti-foreign sentiment resulted in the violent popular movements known as the Boxer Uprising in 1900. Sixty-six years later, another social, at times violent, uprising, known as the Cultural Revolution, attempted to purify the ruling Communist Party of China. Both movements sought to define what it meant to be Chinese in the face of alternative views through the overwhelming force of people in motion. In this time of defining terms, women played critical roles as they too sought to find their place both in terms of nationality and gender. Despite this, whether by circumstance or by choice, women received “scant notice”[1] in historical accounts of twentieth century social unrest in China. Interestingly, in the case of these two uprisings, female participants shared similar characteristics of social background, age, and location that ultimately contributed to their choice to engage in social unrest. These demographic details should serve to inform our understanding both of Chinese history in the twentieth century and provide insights—and perhaps inspiration—to seek out other instances of women’s movements in history to build a more complete narrative.
Examination of the backgrounds of women, known as Red Lanterns, who participated in the Boxer Uprising and the female participants in the Cultural Revolution revealed a series of shared characteristics in their family backgrounds. In the case of those who participated in the Boxer Uprising, as a whole seventy percent of the movement’s composition consisted of young men from meager backgrounds while itinerants and artisans composed the remainder.[2] Many of the recruits came from agricultural backgrounds or the labor force and, due to natural disasters, such as drought, forced into desperation.[3] While these figures principally presented the male side of the Boxer Uprising, some conclusions regarding female participation therein arose from which researchers may extrapolate reasonably information about the remaining thirty percent of Red Lanterns. First, humble parentage and occupations, such as those in agriculture and artistry, formed the largest composition of social classes. The parentage and background of the “supreme leader”[4] of the Red Lanterns, Hung-lien Shêng-mu, validated this assertion. Hung-lien Shêng-mu came from a “modest origin;”[5]either that of a boatman’s daughter or she made a living on her own as a prostitute.[6] Further, if family patriarchs chose to rebel because of suffering brought about by natural disasters, then the premise that daughters also joined in upheaval because of either reliance on their fathers or support or sympathies with their unrest is not beyond reason. As a marginalized demographic to begin with, further aggravated by increased economic pressures on already oppressed classes, gave a promising image to participation as a Red Lantern in the Boxer Uprising. As for female participants in the Cultural Revolution, women with similar family circumstances formed a large part of the membership. According to the memoir Wang Zheng, one female witness of and participant in the Cultural Revolution, “only students from Red families were allowed to join the Red Guards.”[7] Red Families included five categories of social background: workers, poor and lower-middle peasants, revolutionary cadres, revolutionary service members, and revolutionary Martyrs.[8] In the case of the Red Guard, just as that of the Red Lanterns, the predominant backgrounds consisted of modest origins, such as the peasantry. However, the preferred membership of the Red Guards included the addition of members from revolutionary parentage, such as the descendants of cadre members, those with parents in the People’s Revolutionary Army, or children of those killed in the name of spreading the message of the Chinese Communist Party. Despite this seemingly limiting factor of restricted membership in the Red Guard, similar class origins defined membership in both groups. Women who participated in the social unrest of the Red Lanterns and the Red Guards shared similar ages in addition to similar socio-economic backgrounds. In the case of the Red Lanterns, their range of ages appeared among the scarce details of their activities. Historian Paul A. Cohen described the composed membership of the Red Lanterns as “teenage girls and unmarried women.”[9] John D. Spence added a degree of specificity to the range of age to between 12 and 18 years, and included that virginity acted as a prerequisite for membership.[10] The young ages of Red Lanterns identified with those who plausibly still resided with their parents prior to the arrangement of marriage or those who failed to be self-sufficient at the time the Boxer Uprising initiated. The prerequisite of virginity reasonably excluded married womenor mothers from participating in the activities of the Red Lanterns. Obligations of managing households or physical limitations due to age excluded married and elderly women from participation in the Red Lanterns, especially under more violent circumstances. Conversely, while young girls shared the responsibility of chores with other family members, being unrestricted by demands of husbands or children allotted greater potential for the Red Lanterns to participate in the uprising. Female members of the Red Guards occupied and age group that spanned from high school to college age.[11] This range bore a strong similarity to the Red Lanterns. The period of adolescence that both the Red Lanterns and the Red Guards commonly shared may offer some evidence as to why these young women participated in these violent uprisings. Commonly, this period of development received characterization as a time when young people struggled with self-identity and seek to define themselves to their society, to their peers, and to themselves. Where one would expect in a traditional Chinese society, this would mean a good Confucian girl would define herself in those roles as a loyal daughter and wife, or a demure and subservient possible wife. In these cases of social unrest, however, other outlets of identity proved appealing to those seeking identity outside of these strict social constraints. Through association with the movements of the Red Lanterns and the Red Guards, young women achieved a level of socialization and self-identity through association that provided alternatives. The locations of origin of the Red Lanterns and the Red Guard movements both arose in the northern region of China—an interesting variation since the origins of social uprising in China historically occurred in the southern regions. The Red Lanterns began in the early months of 1900, in Zhili. Historian Paul Cohen reported the “high water mark” of Red Lantern activity occurred within the municipality of Tianjin.[12] The prominence of nautical geographic features in Tianjin played an important factor in the origination of Red Lantern activity in the area. The Bohao Wan Gulf, an extension of the Huang Hai or Yellow Sea, for example, laid a relatively short distance, slightly greater than 50 kilometers (or approximately 32 miles), from Tianjin. Furthermore, the Haihe water system flowed into the Bohao Gulf and bisected Tianjin. The access to sea afforded by the water systems of Tianjin made it possible for Western powers, which largely relied on maritime transportation and superiority, admission to the city of Tianjin and other inner regions of China. With Western powers commonly in their midst, young women personally witnessed the presence of foreigners that motivated the larger Boxer movement to violence. The beginning of the student organization that served as a model for other student factions leading to the Red Guard originated in Beijing at Qīnghuá middle school attached to Qīnghuá University.[13] In a similar manner to the discussion of the circumstances of the Red Lanterns, elements of geography and location influenced the rise of Red Guard activity. Beijing contained a dense population that required education to continued indoctrination of new generations in communist theory and rhetoric. However, administers of education—among others—became targets of Chairman’s Mao Zedong’s accusations of a reactionary infection in the Party. Chairman Mao described the teachers to struggle against as those who “treated the students as their enemies.”[14] Young students, eager for what one young female future Red Guard, Rae Yang, described as revenge attacked educators with dazibao (criticism in big characters) and other forms of “political denunciation” and “violent tactics.”[15] Safe from reprimand due to public praise received from Chairman Mao, the Red Guard grew and flourished in the densely packed city of Beijing. However, unlike the Red Lanterns, the Red Guard eventually burst forth from the city of Beijing and spread into the extremities of China to guard against a slackening of Communist ideals. One key area of seeming difference historians have evaluated is the role of ideology in the movements. According to Jerome Ch’én, participants of the Boxer Uprising shared no common ideology.[16] This contrasted strongly against the Red Guards whose motivation to reinforce Communist ideology across China drove their movement. This analysis, however, disregarded a central motivation in the Boxer Uprising, id est, Chinese nationalism and anti-foreign sentiment. So strong is this connection of ideas being a source of motivation between the two groups that quickly the Red Lanterns became the poster children—literally—for females in the Red Guards.[17] Though the ideologies came from different philosophical underpinnings, the role of ideology influenced both groups to a considerable degree. Because of the similarities in social backgrounds, age, and general region, it is of little wonder that during the Cultural Revolution the Red Guard would hearken back with socialist reverence to the Red Lanterns. In 1967, a “dramatic upsurge of articles on the Boxers” appeared in the press,”[18] more because of shared characteristics such as those aforementioned as opposed to factual historical accounts.[19] During the Cultural Revolution, the Party line put forth the romantic idea that the Red Lanterns and Red Guard shared a relationship of “blood brothers and sisters.”[20] While the Red Lanterns never advocated a policy of land reform or the destruction of the Qing dynasty[21] in favor of Marxist communal ownership and government, the did in a similar way express pro-Chinese sentiments. During the Cultural Revolution, clever propagandists attempted to characterize the Red Lanterns and the Boxer Uprising as “the second revolutionary high tide in contemporary Chinese history.”[22] Though a small sampling from only two tumultuous events, it stands to reason that these insights should inform our study and appreciation both of popular uprisings and, more importantly, to build a more complete appreciation of history that examines the role of women therein. [1] Paul A. Cohen, History in Three Keys: The Boxers as Event, Experience, and Myth. (Columbia University Press: New York, 1997), 263. [2] Jonathan D. Spence. The Search for Modern China. (W.W. Norton & Company: New York, 1999), 231. [3] Spence, 230. [4] Jerome Ch’én. “The Nature and Characteristics of the boxer Movement—A Morphological Study,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 23 (1960): 298, note 7. [5] Ch’en, 298, note 7. [6] Ch’en, 298. [7] Wang Zheng. “Call Me Qingnian but Not Funü: A Maoist Youth in Retrospect.” Feminist Studies, 27, (Spring, 2001): 25. [8] Rae Yang. Spider Eaters: A Memoir. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 137. [9] Cohen, 39. [10] Jonathan D. Spence. The Search for Modern China. (W.W. Norton & Company: New York, 1999), 231. [11] Andrew G. Walder. “Beijing Red Guard Factionalist: Social Interpretations Reconsidered.” The Journal of Asian Studies, 61 (2002): 454 and Paul Cohen. “The Contested Past: The Boxers as History and Myth.” The Journal of Asian Studies, 51 (1991), 98. 15 Cohen Three Keys, 39. [12] Cohen, 29. Searching more into records available in this region would prove fruitful in an expansion of this analysis. [13] Joel Andreas. “Battling over Political and Cultural Power during the Chinese Cultural Revolution.” Theory and Society, 31, (August 2002): 465. [14] Rae, 117. [15] Central Intelligence Agency. Red Guards and Party Purge. 19 September 1966. (Declassified 21 October 1999): 1. [16] Ch’en, 296. [17] One may even go so far as to argue that, in reinforcing Chinese Communism across the country in their time that the Red Guards were also reinforcing the anti-foreign sentiments found in early Chinese Communist Party writings. [18] Cohen, Three Keys, 263. [19] Cohen, Three Keys, 264. [20] Cohen, Three Keys, 267-268. [21] “‘People’s Daily’ on the Boxers and the ‘Forbidden Topic’ of Xenophobia” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (12 February 1980), from “Academic notes – different views on evaluating the Boxer movement” People’s Daily (31 January 1980). [22] “‘People’s Daily’ on the Boxers and the ‘Forbidden Topic.’ Works Cited Andreas, Joel. “Battling over Political and Cultural Power during the Chinese Cultural Revolution.” Theory and Society, vol. 31, No. 4. 9August 2002): 463-519. Central Intelligence Agency. Red Guards and Party Purge. 19 September 1966. Declassified 21 October 1999. Ch’én, Jerome. “The Nature and Characteristics of the Boxer Movement—A Morphological Study,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 23 (1960): 287-308. Cohen, Paul A. History in Three Keys: The Boxers as Event, Experience, and Myth. Columbia University Press: New York, 1997. Cohen, Paul. “The Contested Past: The Boxers as History and Myth.” The Journal of Asian Studies, 51 (1991): 82-113. “‘People’s Daily’ on the Boxers and the “Forbidden Topic” of Xenophobia” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (12 February 1980), from “Academic notes – different views on evaluating the Boxer movement” People’s Daily (31 January 1980). Rae Yang. Spider Eaters: A Memoir. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997. Spence, Jonathan D. The Search for Modern China. W.W. Norton & Company: New York, 1999. Walder, Andrew G. “Beijing Red Guard Factionalist: Social Interpretations Reconsidered.” The Journal of Asian Studies, 61 (2002): 437-471. Wang Zheng. “Call Me Qingnian but Not Funü: A Maoist Youth in Retrospect.” Feminist Studies, 27, (Spring, 2001): 9-34.
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EDWARD N. SMITH The spilled inks, shredded trees, and split bamboo slivers that comprise the body of literature on the theory and practice of warfare record the insights of past generations into one of the most harrowing and trying elements of human life. Once author in particular Master Sun Wu (Sunzi) the author of the Sunzi[1] claims the tiger’s share of credit for not only the founding of the Eastern military tradition, but also for heavily influencing Western military thought. His work is regarded so highly that since the original penning of it some twenty five hundred years ago corporations, leadership experts, and even sports teams have attempted to implement Sunzi’s theories into their practices—albeit if only cursory at best. For military historians, Sunzi’s work is an excellent source of insight into Classical Chinese warfare and into the general theories of warfare that dominated East Asia for over two millennia.
The first historic records of Sunzi appear in the official histories of China, the Shiji (Records of the Grand Historian) and the Chunqiu (Spring and Autumn Annals and Wu and Yüeh) as active in his art of war during the early sixth century BCE.[2] According to his entry in the Shiji, Sunzi was a shih (“man of service”) who led the armies of King Hu-lo of Wu (r. 514-496 BCE)[3] during the closing of the sixth century BCE[4] against the armies of Chu ( c. 511 BCE) and Ying.[5] So great were the successes of Sunzi that his performance impressed the states of Qi and Qin (the later was the state that eventually united China under Qin Shi Huang, the first emperor).[6] Despite his success and fame, Sunzi purportedly retired into obscurity.[7] As to the question from whence did Sunzi come, there is some controversy. According to Roger T. Ames, Sunzi was born in Qi (in modern day Shandong province) at the conclusion of the Spring and Autumn Period (c. 770-476 BCE).[8] Ralph D. Sawyer, on the other hand, argues that Sunzi was born in Wu, citing the brief biography of Sunzi included in the Chunqiu; later Sawyer notes that there is, however, evidence in support of theory that Sunzi came from Qi because of the strong “Daoist conceptions” throughout his work, as Qi was a center of Daoist philosophy.[9] This would help to explain the central role that adaptability is a military strength and the metaphor of water to illustrate this point throughout Sunzi’s treatise. Not only is the question of Sunzi’s origin a matter of contention; there is some debate as to whether the Sunzi is a single person, a combination of several persons, or a fictitious character. Mark Edward Lewis argues that Sunzi’s existence is questionable, and that the work that bears his name was likely composed a century later.[10] Roger T. Ames approached the issue from the more moderate position. According to Ames, the Sunzi may be the result of a “process” more “than a single event,” and was likely composed and edited by a number of disciples of Sunzi over the years that followed his death.[11] The strongest evidence that Ames offers in support of this position is that the work makes references to Sun Wu as Sunzi or “Master Sun” which indicate that the text was compiled by persons who regarded him “as a teacher and as an authority of military matters.”[12] However, according to Sawyer, “it seems likely that the historical figure existed and that he not only served as a strategist and possibly a general but also composed the core of the book that bears his name.”[13] Sawyer goes into a bit more detail regarding the three possible origins of the Sunzi. According to Sawyer, the first possible origin is that Sunzi authored the text shortly before his death in the early fifth century BCE.[14] The second possibility is that the text was composed during the middle-to-late Warring States period, as evident by literary clues within the text.[15] The third possibility, based upon evidence similar to that afore mentioned, is that the text was authored during the last half of the fifth century BCE.[16] For Sawyer, it is not so important who and when the work was written, but rather that the core of it was likely composed by Sunzi.[17] Whatever the providence of the work may be, the importance of the work is undeniable. Before delving into the millennia old text, it is important for readers to understand first the military environment and circumstances of Classical China under which Sunzi composed his work. The text comes from a time of great change, a military revolution, if one dares to use seriously such a term, during which time the armies of ancient China experienced a series of significant modifications. According to Sawyer, by the time Sunzi composed his work, the art and science of warfare in China evolved to a point where its ravages endangered “the existence of virtually every state.”[18] And, according to Lewis, the Sunzi reflects the “conditions in the first centuries of the Warring States period…”[19] Lewis continues to describe these conditions: “The polities of this period were ‘states organized for warfare.’ Population registration, universal military service, and ranks of military merit were adapted to enable each state to expand at the expense of its neighbors.”[20] These practices of population registration and military service manifested as mass conscription and gave rise to mass-infantry armies that supplanted the warrior nobility and their chariots.[21] Never again in China’s history did a warrior elite dominate government affairs. It is thus of little surprise that Sunzi’s work found such notoriety and his career so many opportunities for advancement during this tumultuous time in China’s history. Furthermore, with the development of infantry-centric armies, crack troops also developed, the first example appeared in the state of Yue as bodyguards or retinues of nobles.[22] Where before the warrior elite needed little or no personal protection, the new class of elites lacked these essential skills for self-defense of their predecessors. This new development may have also occurred because the social elites felt that extra protection was a necessity during this dangerous and violent time. Furthermore, with the rise of mass infantry and skilled warriors of other classes, it was thus easier for elites to hire out skilled warriors of lesser pedigrees and create significantly larger armies, ranging in numbers from 30,000 to 200,000.[23] This period also observed the development and proliferation of a number of new military technologies. One of the most notable of these was the crossbow.[24] This is perhaps one of the most important symbolic inventions of the period, as the image of a single soldier with a crossbow using a single bolt to neutralize the single most important figure in the opposition is a key illustration of the Eastern model of warfare.[25] This period also witnesses the development of leather and iron armor.[26] These new military technologies created a new battlefield noticeably different from those of previous eras. Because of these developments and the tactical changes brought with them, those commanders who learned most quickly from their experiences were more likely to be victorious. Thus, in this period, a new interpretation on military matters such as that produced by Sunzi was important for commanders wishing to take advantage of the lessons learned from others. Most importantly for our subject, this period witnessed the development of distinct, specialized intellectual disciplines concerned with warfare—a realm that was previously dominated by the warrior-noble elite.[27] According to Stepehn Morillo, et al, “Those with military skills, knowledge, and especially experience were in high demand in all the states, and success in battle was the quickest route up the social scale.”[28] Thus, during the time of Sunzi, warfare was a constant event, where success or failure meant a considerable cost of resources and manpower as various kings vied for control of China. Furthermore, these conditions meant that aspiring and capable men of military minds could find regular and lucrative employment as advisors and commanders. One of the greatest strengths of the text is that it is well laid out and organized. Sunzi presented the information in such a way that readers can ease into the information and study of warfare. To do this, Sunzi began with a discussion of the importance of the study of warfare—an “Introduction to the Philosophy of Warfare,” if one will—that gradually, chapter by chapter, took on issues that were more complex than those in the preceding pages. The introduction, for example, examined how to estimate which commanders or rulers will likely be victorious and who will likely be defeated.[29] This was not only useful in establishing a model for evaluating commanders, but was also essential in the efforts of the work to convince readers, especially aspiring members of the military leadership, of the importance of mastering warfare for the survival of the state. Furthermore, there is also a self-gratifying element here, in that as Sunzi opened his work with a sales pitch of sorts in order to convince readers to hire him or heed his words. While the structure of the work allowed readers to gradually familiarize themselves with Sunzi’s model of warfare, this structure does not detract from nor prohibit the level of thorough detail especially in the later chapters. One prime example of Sunzi’s detailed examination of a topic is in Chapter Six: “Vacuity Substance” or weakness and strength. In this chapter, Sunzi described how to appear weak when strong to bait an enemy, how to appear strong when weak to avoid conflict, and how to create weakness in the opposition’s plans. This adaptability is what Sunzi referred to as formlessness: “Thus the pinnacle of military deployment approaches the formless. If it is formless, then even the deepest spy cannot discern it or the wise make plans against it.”[30] This summation of Sunzi’s hand clearly stated the important lesson of formlessness in warfare. Finally, throughout the text, Sunzi placed a significant responsibility upon the commander. While the first chapter “Initial Estimations” outlines the qualities of a general and how to determine which commander will likely be victorious, the remainder of the work often places the responsibility for victory or defeat in the hands of the commander. This is perhaps best illustrated by Sunzi’s note that “one who excels at warfare seeks [victory] through the strategic configurations of power [shih], not from reliance on men.”[31] Thus, it was not reliance on nor the responsibility of soldiers that determined victory, but the manners in which commanders employed them. One of the most noticeable weaknesses of the available English language translations of the Sunzi is the lack of details regarding army compositions, troop types, and equipment. In order for readers to find information to complete these missing details, they must seek out other historic or archaeological records, the tomb of emperor Qin Shi Huang De being a prime example of the latter. However, because of the otherwise thorough nature of the work, this lack of detail must be a purposeful choice. One reason for this may be that most of the armies of the various states of the Warring States Period were for the most part relatively similar in equipment and composition. Thus, for Sunzi, because these details were common knowledge, there was no reason to write them down, especially considering that his texts would have been hand written. As with any text, especially those from distant cultures, times, and languages, one of the most significant obstacles of this work is that to gain the most from the writings, readers must possess a noteworthy body of outside knowledge. At a minimum, this body of knowledge consists of understanding certain cultural concepts, such as the role of tian (“Heaven”) or Dao (“Way”) and some associated principles of Daosim. In the context of Chinese history, tian often manifests in several forms, such as Tianxia (“under Heaven”), which is an idea that describes the legitimacy or moral appeal of rulers and officials. This idea may in some ways be regarded as a descriptor that indicted the morale of the army or people. Other elements that require some outside knowledge include concepts such as “vacuity” and “substance” which have especially strong implications of Daoist influences that described the value of adaptability in warfare—indeed, in all things. However, this weakness is likely less one of the text (as there is undoubted certainty that Sunzi had no idea that his work would be read in translation thousands of years after his death in so many different cultures) and more a weakness of the cultures of readers. As previously noted in this critique, the Sunzi opens with a statement regarding the importance of warfare for the survival of the state. This is perhaps one of the most important elements of this work—Sunzi made no hesitation in his assertions that warfare is an endeavor of critical importance. Another important understanding of this work is that it provides insights into East Asian military thought that are otherwise unfamiliar (and perhaps even contradictory to) Western notions. One of the most important examples of this Sunzi’s note that, “there are commands from the ruler which are not accepted.”[32] According to Wu Zhu-sung, the “lost” bamboo slips contain additional clarification to this statement. “There are orders from the ruler which are not implemented. If the ruler orders anything contrary to these four, then do not implement it.”[33] Here, “these four” likely refers to the four preceding statements: “There are roads that are not followed, “There are armies that are not attacked, “There are fortified cities that are not assaulted, “There is terrain for which one does not contend.”[34] This differs significantly from the conventional perception of East Asian armies, especially following interactions between the West and East Asian countries during the twentieth century. Because of these interactions, Western countries developed a perception of East Asian countries as being strict and rigid, with complete obedience to superiors. However, Sunzi’s note is contrary to these notions in that the general has a considerable freedom of command when in the field, presumably so long as his commands are issued for the betterment of the state. The Sunzi provided insights into many lessons learned about classical Chinese warfare as well as East Asian warfare. Ames notes most correctly “military practices, often described in detail in these manuals, set precedents for many of China’s later warfare traditions.”[35] These traditions included professional (and at times significantly numerous) armies, merit-based promotions, and diplomacy as part of the military-political system.[36] Whether in the armies of Qin Shi Huang De when he united China, the Sui and Tang invasions of Korea, or the Ming attempts to hold back the Jurchen invasion, these traditions persisted throughout Chinese military history for twenty-five hundred years. Evidence of the influence of Sunzi on these traditions and numerous other works is evident in innumerable other Chinese and East Asian military texts that thought processes, such as the Book of Lord Shang (c. third century BCE), Sun Bin’s The Art of War, “Military Strategies” in the Master of Huai Nan.[37] There are even echoes of Sunzi in Mao Zedong’s treatises on warfare.[38] [1] Many East Asian literary works do not have a distinct title as in Western literary traditions. Instead, these works often simply use the name of the author or an element from the first line of the work—both the case with the Sunzi. [2] Sun-Tzu, “The Art of Warfare,” in The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, Ralph D. Sawyer, eds. and trans. (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1993), 149. Interestingly, Sunzi does not appear in the Zuo Zhuan, another historic record from the period. For historians who presume that Sunzi is a non-historic persona, this lack of mention is a crucial piece of evidence. [3] Sun-Tzu, The Art of Warfare, Roger Ames trans. (New York: The Random House Publishing Group, 1993), 32. [4] Mark Edward Lewis, “Warring States Political History,” in The Cambridge History of Ancient China: From the Origins of Civilization to 221 B.C.Michael Loewe and Edward L. Shaughnessy, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 504. [5] Sawyer, 153. [6] Sawyer, 153. [7] Sawyer, 153. [8] Ames, 32. [9] Sawyer, 150 and 153. [10] Lewis, 504. [11] Ames, 21. [12] Ames, 22. [13] Sawyer, 150-151. [14] Sawyer, 150. [15] Sawyer, 150. [16] Sawyer, 150. [17] Sawyer, 151. [18] Sawyer, 154. [19] Lewis, 627. [20] Lewis, 627. [21] Lewis, 621. [22] Lewis, 621. [23] Lewis, 625-626. [24] Lewis, 622. [25] This imagery is an interesting contrast to the West’s usage of the mass spear-wielding phalanx. [26] Lewis, 625. [27] Lewis, 630. [28] War in World History: Society, Technology, and War from ancient Times to the Present Volume 1 to 1500, Stephen Morillo, Jeremy Black, and Paul Lococo eds. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2009), 26. [29] Sawyer, 157. [30] Sawyer, 168. [31] Sawyer, 166. [32] Sawyer, 171. [33] Sawyer, 447, n. 114. [34] Sawyer, 171. [35] Ames, 35. [36] Ames, 35. [37] Ames, 35. [38] Mao Zedong, On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith II, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000). Works Cited Lewis, Mark Edwards, “Warring States Political History,” in The Cambridge History of Ancient China: From the Origins of Civilization to 221 B.C. edited by Michael Loewe and Edward L. Shaughnessy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Mao Zedong, On Guerrilla Warfare, translated by Samuel B. Griffith II, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000. Sun-Tzu, The Art of Warfare, Roger Ames translated by New York: The Random House Publishing Group, 1993. Sun-Tzu, “The Art of Warfare,” in The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, edited and translated by Ralph D. Sawyer, San Francisco: Westview Press, 1993. War in World History: Society, Technology, and War from ancient Times to the Present Volume 1 to 1500, edited by Stephen Morillo, Jeremy Black, and Paul Lococo New York: McGraw-Hill, 2009. |
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